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Abstract: Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some 
sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The 
tension is particularly manifest in notions such as ‘Chinese philosophy’, ‘Daoist cosmology’, ‘Neo-Confucian idealism’, or ‘Chinese 
metaphysics’. For some, ‘Chinese metaphysics’ may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary 
topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which 
talk about ‘metaphysics’ is frequent and popular and to which talk of ‘Chinese metaphysics’ may wish to contribute: the history of 
philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting ‘Chinese 
metaphysics’ on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet 
often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy – of which talk about ‘Chinese metaphysics’ may but 
need not be an example. 
 
 
Why should one ask the question “Why talk about Chinese metaphysics”? The question is relevant 
for at least two reasons. First, there seems to be a gap between the suspicion which talk of 
metaphysics has met across most and very different quarters in professional philosophy in the 
twentieth century and the light-heartedness with which the term has been used during the same 
period of time and up to the present day by those researching or doing ‘Chinese philosophy’. 
Secondly, the use of the adjective ‘Chinese’ in the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ seems 
awkward if we consider what many take ‘metaphysics’ very roughly to mean, namely something 
like a concern with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world. It would seem that 
the object of the concern, i.e. the fundamental nature of being and the world, should be the same for 
Chinese as well as for non-Chinese. Obviously, rather than having something to do with the object 
of the concern, the adjective might indicate a specifically ‘Chinese’ approach, a ‘Chinese’ 
conceptual map, a ‘Chinese’ sense, or many other things, but my concern is that these uses of the 
adjective ‘Chinese’ potentially in many cases and clearly in some cases include a political side that 
foregrounds goals and purposes far beyond the precincts of the philosophy department. 
Let me elaborate on these two reasons in some more detail. As is widely known, the term 
‘metaphysics’ has had a rather troubled history. For one thing, the meaning of the term’s first 
occurrence as µετὰ τὰ φυσικά (meta ta physica) in the title for some of Aristotle’s treatises is still 
contested, that is, it is unclear whether its use was bibliographical or a substantive, perhaps noetic, 
reference to the contents of the treatises.1 For another thing, and perhaps more troubling, the 
                                                
1  Since the 1950s, scholars have challenged the longstanding view which attributed the term ‘metaphysics’ to the 
librarian Andronicus of Rhodes arguing that Aristotle himself or a not too distant follower of his, the Peripatetic 
Ariston of Ceos, named these treatises on ‘first philosophy’ (prote philosophia πρώτη φιλοσοφία) meta ta physika. 
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history of the term ‘metaphysics’ has been one of a series of farewells, bid by those who wished to 
leave behind some sort of metaphysics and to install, explicitly or implicitly, some new 
metaphysics. David Hume, for instance, thoroughly criticized metaphysics, yet insisted on 
cultivating what he called “true metaphysics.”2 Immanuel Kant bade farewell to speculative 
metaphysics but himself continued to use the term ‘metaphysics’, highlighted the importance of 
metaphysics as science, and arguably produced no less than a metaphysics (albeit of another sort).3 
Nietzsche perhaps was among the first to sound the death knell for the term, and this has indeed 
become the general theme for much of twentieth century philosophy where the end of metaphysics 
has been announced by many, pragmatists, logical positivists and deconstructionists alike. For 
Charles Sanders Peirce, “ontological metaphysics” was either “meaningless gibberish” or 
“downright absurd.”4 Rudolf Carnap found metaphysics to be of a “deceptive character” only 
capable of providing “the illusion of knowledge.”5 Jacques Derrida, finally, dismantled what he 
took to be a metaphysics of presence, visible in the entire ‘Western’ metaphysical tradition and in 
his view no more than a futile attempt to fix the meaning of conceptual oppositions thereby freezing 
the play of linguistic differences. 
Interestingly and somewhat perplexingly, the term seems to have fallen out of favor in 
Europe and America just as it made its first appearances as xing’ershangxue ???? in China 
(reintroduced into modern Chinese by way of the Japanese using a classical Chinese-character 
compound of the Yijing ?? to translate the modern ‘European’ word6) and there among some of 
the leading intellectuals of the day gained a popularity which still seems to fuel contemporary 
debates. Hence, while talk about metaphysics in Europe is viewed with utmost suspicion in many 
(although not all) quarters of contemporary philosophy or is largely used metaphorically only (e.g. 
as an equivalent of Weltanschauung), the situation seems to be quite different in China and with 
those who do ‘Chinese philosophy’ elsewhere. Not only is the term???? frequently and we 
should assume meaningfully used, but it is further used in the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ (?
                                                                                                                                                            
According to these scholars, the sequence is deliberatively chosen to make a didactic point, for noetically, the 
subject matter of the works on physics is prior to that on metaphysics. Hence, this view sees a link between the title, 
Metaphysics, and the content treated in the books. See: Moraux, 1951, 314–315; Chroust, 1961, 601–616; Reiner, 
1969, 139–174. 
2  “[We] must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate.” See: Hume, 
1978, 1. 
3  “That the human mind would someday entirely give up metaphysical investigations is just as little to be expected, as 
that we would someday gladly stop all breathing so as never to take in impure air. There will therefore be 
metaphysics in the world at every time, and what is more, in every human being, and especially the reflective ones: 
metaphysics that each, in the absence of a public standard of measure, will carve out for themselves in their own 
manner.” See: Kant, 2004, 118. 
4  Peirce, 1905, 423. 
5  Carnap, 1935, sec. 5. 
6  Liu, 1995, 325.  
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?????) . The qualifying adjective ‘Chinese’ is interesting.7 Whatever else ‘metaphysics’ is 
taken to mean, the qualification reveals a particularistic understanding, although what particularity 
precisely is invoked by the term ‘Chinese’ is unclear.  
If it makes sense to talk about ‘Chinese’ metaphysics, however, then there are at least two 
presuppositions on a conceptual level that go with it: (1) the adjective introduces a dividing line 
emphasizing that ‘Chinese’ metaphysics is different from non-Chinese metaphysics (Western, 
Greek, Christian, European, American, Cartesian, Kantian, Indian, perhaps Buddhist, etc.); (2) yet 
calling both ‘metaphysics’, the dividing line also relates what is differentiated as ‘Chinese’ and 
‘non-Chinese’. There can be no difference without at least one commonality in the respect of which 
the differentiated is what it purports to be, namely different. The first presupposition is that which 
most scholars who use the expression wish to emphasize, i.e. the distinctiveness of ‘Chinese 
metaphysics’. But the second presupposition, i.e. the commonality shared with other metaphysics, is 
almost systematically ignored. Zhao Dunhua ??? has pointed out this problematique in a recent 
article: 
The defender of a uniquely Chinese metaphysics … seems to me to appeal to the relativist thesis of 
incommensurability. If there were nothing in common at all between Chinese and Western metaphysics, 
one would not be able to speak of metaphysics with reference to the Chinese term ????, which can 
be unmistakably identified with the Western term “metaphysics”.8 
The situation gets further complicated in a multilingual setting where ‘Chinese metaphysics’ can 
either refer to something ‘Chinese’, for which metaphysics functions as a term of translation, or to 
something allegedly ‘non-Chinese’, with which metaphysics (as a term to be translated) is 
associated and for which a Chinese language equivalent is sought. The present article aims to clarify 
the meaning of the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ and the scholarly interest that may motivate 
talk about it. 
A short preliminary note on my methodological approach seems in order. In this article, I 
pursue a systematic approach since I am interested in registering different uses of ‘metaphysics’ as 
if they were all uses of some same concept (which is partly why we refer to them in each case as 
‘metaphysics’). This also means that I do not consider any of them to be simply a homonym. A 
systematic approach implies that one de-contextualizes to some degree and my discussion indeed is 
                                                
7  It should be noted that it is not always the case that the adjective in an adjective-noun expression is the qualifying 
part. Sometimes the whole expression stands for the particularism, such as when say ‘Western metaphysics’ is 
juxtaposed to ‘Chinese spirituality’. Each of the expressions in this case may but need not be pleonastic, for one 
could well imagine someone holding that there is ‘Western’ and ‘Indian’ metaphysics, but no ‘Chinese metaphysics’. 
It seems to be however clear that this is not how ‘Chinese metaphysics’ as an expression is used.  
8  Zhao Dunhua, “Metaphysics in China and in the West: Common Origin and Later Divergence”, in Frontiers of 
Philosophy in China, 2006 (1): 23. 
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highly schematic. Only some uses of ‘metaphysics’ are discussed and briefly contrasted with actual 
or possible uses of the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ to see whether any of them may explain 
the use of the term ‘metaphysics’ in the latter. Yet, I also address issues relevant to comparative 
approaches since my final goal of analysis is to explore uses of ‘Chinese metaphysics’ with an 
emphasis on the use of the term ‘Chinese’ in the expression along the lines outlined above.  
To be as clear as I can I should emphasize that by no means do I mean to claim that the use 
of ‘metaphysics’ in the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ necessarily must match up with one of the 
registered uses (although I would uphold that it should be relatable in some way to some uses of the 
term). At the end, the question might be as much illuminated by ruling out some uses as it would be 
by claiming to have found the one use. Moreover, it would of course be very wrong-headed to 
assume in the first place that there is just one use of the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’. Strictly 
speaking, there probably are as many as the number of those who use it (and perhaps even more). 
The aim of this article is not at all to account for all these actual uses, which would be impossible, 
nor to give a fair picture of the variety of its uses, which would perhaps be possible yet still seems 
overly ambitious and unnecessary for the present purposes, but merely to hint at one or two uses 
which seem to be common enough to mark out a dominant position in the discourse. 
In contemporary philosophy, there are two discourses, namely the history of philosophy and 
analytic philosophy, in which there clearly is much talk of metaphysics (i.e. the term appears as a 
topic in scholarly work, in titles of conferences, etc.). In what follows, I shall examine each briefly 
to see whether it may throw light on the use of the term ‘metaphysics’ in the expression ‘Chinese 
metaphysics’.9 I take that expression to be used mainly by those who have an interest in ‘Chinese 
philosophy’, which is also to say that a discussion of the uses of the term ‘metaphysics’ in the 
expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ might well also inform debates over ‘Chinese philosophy’ (of 
course again a much debated expression). I take these discourses to be obvious choices, knowing 
that they need not be equally obvious in the eyes of others. None of them should be understood as 
forming a unitary discourse in the sense that there is consensus about the meaning of ‘metaphysics’. 
The term, ‘metaphysics’, might even be at the very centre of contestation. Here the reader is 
referred to the more specialized literature, which offers all differentiations one might miss in my 
discussion, yet which is, I submit, not of any larger importance for the argument presented in this 
                                                
9  I do not deny that there are many other contemporary discourses in which the term ‘metaphysics’ is used, but would 
argue that in most of these the term is either used metaphorically (see for instance French’s Cowboy Metaphysics, 
French 1997) or used to speak about that which the author in question thinks one should no longer speak about. 
Surely, there are also innovative attempts by contemporary philosophers who argue against the ‘end-of-metaphysics-
thesis’, but they are usually motivated by the belief that the thesis has become a commonplace in the discourse to 
which they wish to contribute. Hence, talk about metaphysics is not dominant in that specific discourse. See for 
instance the PhD thesis by Julia Sushytska on “Originary Metaphysics: Why Philosophy has not Reached its End”: 
Sushytska, 2008. 
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article. I will then examine the claim that there is a specifically ‘Chinese’ metaphysics, for what 
precisely is meant by the qualifying adjective ‘Chinese’ may differ and may be unclear. My final 
contention will be that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting ‘Chinese 
metaphysics’ on the academic agenda and I shall examine the extent to which these reasons might 
be claimed to be primarily political. My discussion hence seeks to highlight the dimension of a 
politics of comparative philosophy. 
 
1. Talk of Metaphysics in the History of Philosophy 
A first and rather obvious discourse in which the term ‘metaphysics’ is frequently used is that of the 
history of philosophy. We readily speak of Aristotelian, Thomistic or Cartesian metaphysics or the 
metaphysics of, say, Plotin, Leibniz or Kant. However, from a methodological point of view, that 
readiness and the appropriateness of using the term ‘metaphysics’ might be questioned in each of 
these instances. Were Aristotle, Plotin, Leibniz and Kant really speaking about the same thing, the 
same ‘metaphysics’? Perhaps so, but a persuasive answer to the question seems nonetheless 
important for anyone who decides to base his or her historiographical scholarship on that assertion. 
There are also authors and texts where we might not feel equally comfortable to speak of 
‘metaphysics’ in the first place, or would feel compelled to offer additional argument. For one thing, 
there is the case of applying the term to the writing of those who clearly wrote before the term was 
coined such as Plato and Aristotle, or the authors of the pre-Socratic writings or even the Homeric 
epics. If one takes Aristotle’s book later given the title Metaphysics as measure for what qualifies as 
metaphysics, then to what extent, for instance, is talk of ‘Plato’s metaphysics’ appropriate, given 
that Aristotle offers an account of reality precisely in contradistinction to Plato’s assertion that what 
is real are the ideals and that physical objects and physical events only exist insofar as they 
instantiate these ideals? It takes not much to see that again difference comes with commonality and 
that the above characterization of ‘contradistinction’ opens the ground on which an argument might 
be produced that there is ‘metaphysics’ in Plato (at least both seem to be concerned about what is 
real, and if that is what one takes ‘metaphysics’ to be about, then very clearly both Plato and 
Aristotle did ‘metaphysics’). 
 Qualifying as ‘metaphysical’ the work of those authors who were not only familiar with the 
term ‘metaphysics’, but perhaps last of all would have qualified their own work as dealing with 
‘metaphysics’ is another obvious case asking for additional argument. Nietzsche, Heidegger or 
Wittgenstein perhaps come to mind. Each of them in some sense wrote in contradistinction to what 
they perceived to be metaphysics. This is different from Plato who could not possibly have 
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subscribed to the explicit thought that he is doing ‘metaphysics’ or doing something in 
contradistinction to it. The mentioned philosophers all were aware of previous uses of the term 
‘metaphysics’, but wished to overcome it, to do something else, to establish a counter-discourse. 
The commonality which allows subsuming their differences as a difference in some common 
respect is the simple negative reference to an end of metaphysics. In positive terms, the 
commonality in these cases perhaps is not to be searched in a superordinate concept of metaphysics, 
but e.g. in notions such as that of ‘a new beginning of philosophy’, where one kind of philosophy 
involves metaphysics and another, the allegedly new kind of philosophy, does not. Obviously, many 
of those who have claimed to present a philosophy without a metaphysics have later been 
reproached of having simply ignored their own underlying metaphysical assumptions. Hence, about 
each of the mentioned philosophers there is scholarly work which purports to examine their 
‘metaphysics’ in a historical perspective. 
 Three points seem to me particularly important in debates over whether a text is to be read 
as a ‘metaphysical’ text in the history of philosophy. The first point concerns the distinction 
between an exclusive and an inclusive understanding of the term. Does one approach the text with a 
fixed definition of what counts as metaphysics and what does not, or does one allow for the 
possibility of being surprised by the text so as to broaden one’s view of what counts as metaphysics? 
If I take Aristotle as measure of what metaphysics is and exclusively define it as an interest in the 
being of material objects and events in the exact manner displayed in Aristotle, then Plato – and, 
strictly speaking, probably everyone else – fails to be a metaphysician. If, however, I am open to the 
possibility of broadening the definition gleaned from Aristotle, I might come to see metaphysics, 
say, as an interest in reality regardless of how that reality is conceived, and then Aristotle as well as 
Plato may be considered as authors dealing with metaphysics. In my view, there is no philosophical 
criterion conclusively to tell whether an exclusive or an inclusive understanding of the term 
commends itself (other than perhaps the ineffectiveness of the extremes, i.e. conceptual narrowness 
or conceptual overstretch).  
Complicating the issue is a second point. The absence or presence of the term ‘metaphysics’ 
(or of some key terms associated with it) in the texts to be read for their metaphysics might give rise 
to a distinction between the understanding of the term as it presents itself in the text versus the 
understanding of the term as it is imposed upon a text. Although I find the distinction to be 
indicating a difference in degree rather than in kind (because both a grasp of the term as it presents 
‘itself’ as well as a total imposition, which would deny any importance whatsoever to the text upon 
which the term is imposed, seems hermeneutically impossible or undesirable respectively), it makes 
a whole lot of a difference what a historian of philosophy claims to do. Yet, again, I do not see a 
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compelling reason how one approach trumps the other, as both are simply claims that can be given 
good or bad arguments.  
The third point also has to do with claims. Does a historian of philosophy claim that his or 
her use of the term ‘metaphysics’ with a view to several texts implies a substantive account of 
metaphysics, i.e. an account prompted by the contents of these texts themselves, or that the term is 
merely used for heuristic purposes, i.e. to make possible an ordered account and presentation of the 
contents? Nowadays, claims of employing a term only heuristically are popular precisely because it 
takes away from the pressure to offer substantive arguments. Yet, any heuristic account will to 
some degree have to involve a substantive account and to that degree an argument is required. 
Whatever approach is taken in the history of philosophy to the question of whether or not a use of 
the term ‘metaphysics’ is apposite, it requires additional argument. Contrary to the many debates 
about whether a term may or may not be used in such and such context, I would hold that it is never 
the use of a term itself that is at issue but rather the arguments that go with it, arguments behind 
which sometimes lurk the interests of those who use the term, as they do with those who argue 
against its use.  
Were we now to consider the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ as well as some related 
expressions such as ‘Confucian metaphysics’ or ‘Buddhist metaphysics’ and debates over the 
appositeness of the term ‘metaphysics’ in them with regard to the history of philosophy, then we 
would see that much the same or at least similar points are being discussed. Can we use the term 
‘metaphysics’ for texts whose authors not possibly could have been acquainted with it? Do the 
Lunyu ?? or the Daodejing ??? hence display a metaphysics? If an exclusively Aristotelian 
understanding of the term is applied they probably do not, but things may be different with an 
inclusive understanding. What about using the term heuristically, i.e. with an indicated interest to 
arrange usefully one’s material, say, with a very inclusive definition of metaphysics and a clear and 
argued statement that one is imposing the term? Is there a point in the history of Chinese philosophy 
from which onward there clearly is talk about metaphysics such as after Buddhism entered China or, 
as Tang Yongtong ??? (1893–1964) has argued, with the coming about of Xuanxue ??, 
which in his view was about “ontology” and stood in contrast to the earlier Han philosophers’ 
occupation with “cosmology” and “cosmogony”?10 Or why not let ‘metaphysics’ begin with that 
passage in the Yijing on??? (which the Japanese originators probably chose for a reason)? One 
could then use that understanding of the term ‘metaphysics’ as ??? again either inclusively or 
exclusively, which in the latter case could lead one to doubt seriously whether Aristotle indeed had 
                                                
10  See: Wagner, 2003, 83. 
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a metaphysics. That, in my view, would be a legitimate doubt which all has to do with the 
inclusivity and exclusivity of the applied understanding and nothing with the question whether 
something is Chinese or not. 
The point is that any claim of a beginning of ‘metaphysical’ talk in Chinese philosophy 
depends on the arguments for one’s understanding of the term ‘metaphysics’ (or of ‘ontology’ in 
Tang’s case). Let us consider Tang Yongtong’s argument in a little more detail by quoting some 
crucial passages. He writes: 
[The philosophy of the Dark of the Wei and Jin] had gone beyond the narrow attachment to the external functions ?? 
of cosmic movements and had proceeded to discuss the substance ?? of Heaven, Earth, and the ten thousand kinds of 
entities. The Han dynasty reckoned Heaven and Dao as part of physical nature; the Wei and Jin dismissed Heaven and 
the Dao and explored the substance ??; for them the singular controlled the many and brought them back to the dark 
ultimate… 
They discarded physical phenomena, transcended time and space, and studied the true limit, zhenji ??, of Heaven, 
Earth, and the ten thousand kinds of entities.11  
To say the least, these characterizations of ontology do not strike me as obviously fitting the 
Aristotelian emphasis on physical phenomena, but one might probably produce arguments for an 
understanding of ontology which would capture Wang Bi’s as well as, say, Plato’s writings. 
Note also that Tang Yongtong’s definition seems to rely on a distinction between ontology 
and cosmology. The latter of which in its composite form of kosmos (κόσµος) and logos (λόγος) is a 
relative late term and was popularised by Christian Wolff, who in 1730 published a book entitled 
Cosmologia generalis. In that book, Wolff established cosmology alongside ontology, psychology 
and natural theology as subdivisions of metaphysics. If one assumes this point of view and follows 
Tang in that there was cosmology in Han China, then there clearly was talk about metaphysics, and 
even so in the pre-Qin period. A classic example is the Zhongyong ??, which according to Ezra 
Pound “contains what is usually supposed not to exist, namely the Confucian metaphysics.”12 And 
if you think Pound to be at best a second-rate authority on the Zhongyong, then mind that Tu 
Weiming ???  refers to this note of Pound as “fascinating”, and has used the term 
‘metaphysics’ himself in that context, when referring to cheng ? (what he translates as sincerity, 
reality, truth) as a “metaphysical concept”, as well as in the more general context of other pre-Qin 
Confucian philosophy.13 
In my view, the use of the term ‘metaphysics’ – when talking about the history of 
philosophy – does not pose any serious philosophical problem, regardless of whether it is European, 
                                                
11  Quoted from: Wagner, 2003, 85. For the Chinese original, see: Tang (2001), 43–44. 
12  Pound, 1969, 95. 
13  Tu, 1989, 17 and 132 fn. 28. 
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Chinese or any other philosophy that is concerned. For it is not the use of the term itself that is or 
can be problematic, but the arguments (or their absence) that provide the reasoning for the use. 
Hence, if by ‘Chinese metaphysics’ is meant ‘metaphysics in the history of Chinese philosophy’, 
then talk about it seems to me entirely apposite to the extent that the question why one should talk 
about it poses itself in no different a manner than it poses itself in the history of ‘European’ or any 
other philosophy. The reasons why one should or should not talk about ‘metaphysics’ in all of these 
cases hinges on the arguments underlying one’s understanding of the term, one’s claims attached to 
the use and one’s purposes for using it rather than on whether or not the text itself is characterized 
as ‘Chinese’ or not. It is not because a text is ‘Chinese’ that the term ‘metaphysics’ should or should 
not be used in historiography. 
 
2. Talk of Metaphysics in Analytic Philosophy 
A second discourse in which the term ‘metaphysics’ is frequently used is analytic philosophy. 
Although analytic philosophers have initially been at the forefront of the critique of metaphysics, 
the eventual demise of logical positivism and its verificationist criterion of meaningfulness around 
the mid-20th century has given rise to new talk about ‘metaphysics’, albeit in very specific senses of 
the term. In a historical survey of analytic philosophy, Hans-Johann Glock distinguishes what he 
calls “three distinct metaphysical seeds”.14  
The first seed was planted by Willard Van Orman Quine, who developped a naturalistic 
approach to ontology implying a “blurring of the boundary between speculative metaphysics and 
natural science.”15 It was however not traditional metaphysics that Quine tried to revitalize, 
denying, as Glock put it, “that a priori philosophical reflection can establish what kinds of things 
there are.”16 He still sought to establish what kinds of things there are, but not in a sort of 
rationalism but by helping science to explicate its underlying metaphysics.17 Glock sums up 
Quine’s approach as follows: 
[Quine’s naturalism] helps science in drawing up an inventory of the world. It translates our scientific theories into an 
ideal formal language (‘canonical notation’) and thereby clarifies and, where possible, reduces their ‘ontological 
commitments’, the types of entities the existence of which these theories presuppose.18  
Glock illustrates the reduction of ontological commitment by way of translation into a canonical 
                                                
14  Glock, 2008, 48. 
15  Quine, 1953, 20. 
16  Glock, 2008, 48. 
17  This statement should be qualified to forestall misunderstanding as Quine makes it abundantly clear that he looks to 
“variables and quantification for evidence as to what a theory says that there is, not for evidence as to what there is.” 
See: Quine, 1960, 243, fn.5 
18  Glock, 2008, 48. 
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notation with the example of ‘The rose is red’, which containing “a name for a property … seems to 
commit us to the existence of an intensional entity”, and ∀x (x is red → x is a color), which does not. 
Instead of analyzing the ontological commitments that science relies on, Quine seeks to replace 
them by less problematic analogues, thereby revealing its underlying metaphysics. Quine’s 
approach has been extraordinarily influential with contemporary naturalists, in Glock’s words 
amounting to the claim that by “exploring the things our best current scientific theories take to exist, 
they also purport to provide the best account of what things actually exist.”19  
    Much in contrast to Quine’s rapprochment with science stands Peter Strawson’s ‘descriptive 
metaphysics’ which offers the second seed for a revival of metaphysics. Strawson is very 
appreciative of ‘ordinary language philosophy’, which “up to a point” is “the best, and indeed the 
only sure, way in philosophy,” but he has come to believe that it unduly shuns the need for 
metaphysics, for “when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing 
at a certain level, are apt to assume, and not to expose those general elements of structure which the 
metaphysician wants revealed.”20 These general elements are what descriptive metaphysics is after, 
i.e. the description of “the actual structure of our thought about the world”, and it does so by 
focusing on such seemingly ordinary matters of everyday discourse as referring to a particular item 
and predicating something about it. Descriptive metaphysics is different from revisionary 
metaphysics which seeks “to produce a better structure”.21 Strawson explicates in more detail what 
he means by that actual metaphysical structure that is to be described: 
For there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history – or none recorded in histories of thought; 
there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are not 
the specialities of the most refined thinking. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking; and are yet the 
indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings. It is with these, their 
interconnexions, and the structure that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned.22 
We think of the world as containing particular things some of which are independent of ourselves; we think of the 
world’s history as made up of particular episodes in which we may or may not have a part; and we think of these 
particular things and events as included in the topics of our common discourse, as things about which we can talk to each 
other. These are remarks about the way we think of the world, about our conceptual scheme. A more recognizably 
philosophical, though no clearer, way of expressing them would be to say that our ontology comprises objective 
particulars. It may comprise much else besides.23 
Hence, what Strawson has in mind are objective particulars, foremost material bodies and persons, 
the existence of which is presupposed in the actual structure of our thought. Material bodies and 
persons are fundamental categories in that structure and it is the task of descriptive metaphysics, 
                                                
19  Glock, 2008, 49 (emphases in the original). 
20  Strawson, 1959, 9. 
21  Strawson, 1959, 9. 
22  Strawson, 1959, 10. 
23  Strawson, 1959, 15. 
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according to Strawson, to show how they “hang together and how they relate, in turn, to those 
formal notions (such as existence, identity, and unity) which range through all categories.”24 To see 
that Strawson uses the term ‘metaphysics’ in a very specific sense it suffices to point out his 
acknowledgment that that for which he has tried to give a rational account in fact and in a sense 
rests on beliefs “stubbornly held” by many people and also by some philosophers. Metaphysics, in 
Strawson’s account, comes to mean “the finding of reasons, good, bad or indifferent, for what we 
believe on instinct.”25 Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics with its emphasis on a ‘massive core of 
human thinking’ has rightly been called “something of a return to Kant, though without his 
idealism”.26 
 Finally, according to Glock, a third seed has been planted by the rise of modal logic and of 
theories of ‘direct reference’ such as those offered by contemporary essentialism. This particularly 
applies to proper names and natural kind terms, which are ‘rigid designators’ (in all possible worlds 
they designate the same thing if they designate anything at all, namely the essence of that thing, e.g. 
H2O). According to Saul Kripke, if and only if something is true in all possible worlds, it is 
necessarily so and necessity is a notion of “metaphysics”.27 Truths about rigid designators are 
necessary but also a posteriori, i.e. subject to scientific or empirical discovery. Contemporary 
essentialism can hence claim to be in line with Quine’s naturalism in important ways, even if the 
latter held that philosophy should not concern itself with necessity and essences because that is the 
business of science. Glock explains: 
But if some necessary truths – truths about the essence of things – are a posteriori, philosophy can be continuous with 
science precisely because it scrutinizes such essences. This presupposes, however, that sense can be made of modal 
notions like that of possible worlds.28 
It is important to note that all three ‘metaphysical seeds’ remain within the framework of the 
linguistic turn. That framework eventually was questioned by Grice and Searle, who turned 
linguistic philosophy into a sub branch of the philosophy of mind. Approaches of the Chomskian ilk 
have done further work toward reversing the linguistic turn, also turning against Grice, by arguing 
against the idea that meaning and language are rooted in communication.29 This has made the 
philosophy of mind the most thriving part of analytic philosophy, perhaps currently exemplified by 
someone like Jerry Fodor, who has argued that the meaning of public languages and intentionality 
of thought can be explained by a ‘language of thought’ (LOT).30 Thus, today, Quinean naturalism 
                                                
24  Strawson, 1967, 318. 
25  Strawson, 1959, 247. 
26  Hamlyn, 1995, 558. 
27  Kripke, 1980, 35.  
28  Glock, 2008, 50–51. 
29  See: Glock, 2008, 54. 
30  See for his most recent statement: Fodor, 2008. 
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and essentialism leads many to consider the philosophy of mind as a sub branch of psychology, 
biology and neuroscience with the only task left to philosophy being the naturalization of mental 
phenomena, “i.e. to show that they are fully explicable in the terms of physical science.”31 
Given the revival of metaphysics in analytic philosophy, does the expression ‘Chinese 
metaphysics’ refer to literature seeking to contribute to that specific discourse? I would say that this 
is generally not the case. Those pursuing Chinese philosophy have seen their topic as differing 
radically from analytic philosophy, so it is likely that their talk about ‘Chinese metaphysics’ is not 
directed toward discourse in analytic philosophy and that they purposely remain at a distance from 
natural science discourse. But could it possibly contribute? From among the mentioned seeds, 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics might seem to offer some intriguing possibility, but I hasten to 
add that, to my mind, it really only seems so. When Strawson writes that “we think of the world as” 
such and such, he surely by “we” means all humans. But when he then continues the sentence by 
“the world as containing particular things some of which are independent of ourselves”, does he not 
then assume some view as common which really is common to some humans only. One major 
claim of distinction of much of ‘Chinese metaphysics’ precisely is that instead of things there really 
are only events and processes and that instead of independency (between subject and object) there 
really is a sort of continuity (heyi ??). Hence, Strawson’s approach might be promising but, 
along this line of reasoning, he is mistaken in assuming that “our conceptual scheme” refers to all 
human thinking when it really just refers to a ‘European’ philosophical view. His approach might be 
promising inasmuch as ‘Chinese metaphysics’ expresses an alternative conceptual scheme, based on 
different beliefs guided by a different instinct, and that scheme might be described. I think that 
something along the lines of an ‘alternative-conceptual-scheme-thesis’ is frequently argued in 
comparative philosophy (although not drawing on Strawson at all), but I am not yet convinced by 
the arguments.  
If one were to establish a ‘Chinese metaphysics’ on the basis of Strawson’s descriptive 
metaphysics and to spell out the way of ‘Chinese thinking’ about the world, one would by ‘Chinese’ 
either have to refer to conceptualizations on the basis of writings (considered to be ‘Chinese’), 
which is not what Strawson is about, or have to refer to the thinking of actual human beings, which 
is what he is about, but on that level there simply is no case to be made for a process and continuity 
kind of thought somehow held by those considered ‘Chinese’. Strawson’s claims are all built upon 
such activities as reference and predication, i.e. identifying and talking about material objects and 
persons. And there is in my view no doubt that ‘Chinese’ refer and predicate as much as anybody 
else does. If someone asks someone else to take a seat, the reference is to that person and to some 
                                                
31  Glock, 2008, 55. 
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material object to sit on, e.g. a chair. Remember that Strawson is interested in the “commonplaces 
of the least refined thinking” and not in the “specialities of the most refined thinking.” Arguments 
about the ‘Chinese’ process view however are expressions of highly refined thinking. In ordinary 
dealings, it simply is not the case that the identification, reference and predication of ‘Chinese’ 
people is somehow not involving persons and material objects. ‘Chinese’ also sit on a chair and not 
on a process, as much as ‘Europeans’ sit on a chair and not on an Aristotelian essence-plus-
accidents or a Kantian noumenon/phenomenon. The difference between ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-
Chinese’ perhaps only comes in once one is interested in that sort of texts where very sophisticated 
minds have tried to answer what a chair precisely is, say, whether a thing or rather an event, and so 
on. But these are questions which according to many accounts no longer fall into the domain of 
metaphysics as they can be safely left to science. At least that seems to be Strawson’s view, and it 
seems to me that his descriptive metaphysics is unrelated to any distinction between ‘Chinese’ and 
‘non-Chinese’.  
There is also a more recent trend mainly among scholars in the United States to establish a 
dialogue between analytic and Chinese philosophy. Mou Bo ?? has been a driving force in this 
and his collections of essays on Chinese philosophy on the one hand and analytic philosophy, 
Davidson and Searle on the other hand do not merely bring together scholarly work that pursues 
contrastive approaches, but also some that seeks substantially to contribute to the discussions in 
analytic philosophy.32 Another example of this kind is Liu Xiusheng’s essay on Mengzian 
internalism, which by reading the Mengzi ?? for its metaphysics invokes and to some extent 
also probes contemporary metaphysical theories (John McDowell, David Wiggens).33 Insofar as the 
Mengzi is a text which by many is referred to as a key text of Chinese philosophy, it seems that Liu 
may be considered as doing ‘Chinese’ metaphysics. Given the systematic interests of analytical 
philosophers however, one would assume that the qualifying adjective ‘Chinese’ should not be of 
much philosophical import as concerns the arguments Liu develops from his reading of the Mengzi.  
 
3. Talk of Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy  
There are surely many uses of the expression “Chinese metaphysics” in a historiographical 
perspective and with the qualifications that I have given above I find not much of a problem in such 
a use of the expression itself. But equally many, if not the majority of uses of the expression, are it 
seems not aptly captured by calling them historiographical. Those who talk about ‘Chinese 
                                                
32  See: Mou, 2001; Mou, 2006; Mou, 2008. 
33  See: Liu, 2002. 
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metaphysics’ would not wish to be taken for historians of philosophy. They would want that which 
they do to count as contemporary philosophy, as ‘Chinese philosophy’ that is. But in terms of 
contemporary philosophy we are still left with the problem of what is meant by the qualifying 
adjective ‘Chinese’ in the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ (and perhaps equally in the expression 
‘Chinese philosophy’). It is not the use of the expression that I have discussed in the context of 
analytic philosophy, which would tend to de-emphasize the adjective ‘Chinese’. In most uses of the 
expression in contemporary academic discourse, there is indeed an utter emphasis on the adjective 
‘Chinese’ and more often than not it is even the main contention. 
A concrete example might be helpful. Robert Cummings Neville published an article in 
2003 in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy on the topic ‘Metaphysics in Contemporary Chinese 
Philosophy’. Neville’s article is, so much I should immediately say, not at all blind towards the state 
of talk about metaphysics in philosophy departments around the world and in almost exemplary 
manner (although I think eventually unsuccessfully) engages with the arguments that have 
motivated the assertions of an end of metaphysics. Indeed, Neville starts off by writing: 
… most prominent forms of philosophy today, both Chinese and Western, take metaphysics to be an 
unnecessary, outmoded, and distracting (if not perverse) enterprise. In the West this deprecation of 
metaphysics is a Kantian legacy maintained by both Continental and analytical philosophers, with a few 
notable exceptions. In East Asia it results from construing the Chinese philosophical tradition as primarily 
ethical and practical, not theoretical.34  
It might be interesting to note that in line with this assessment of the situation in East Asia, a 
conference has been held in Beijing last year on the topic of Chinese epistemology and Chinese 
metaphysics.35 Anyhow, what is important is that Neville starts off by stating that there is a 
common depreciation of metaphysics in the West and in East Asia and by arguing that both are 
equally misguided in that depreciation. There is in Neville’s view a “need for metaphysics” to 
address various current crises, for example, in matters of distributive justice or ecology. The 
challenge is, as Neville sees it, that those pursuing Chinese philosophy “need to articulate 
metaphysical systems as detailed and abstract as Whitehead’s”; furthermore, what he calls the 
“Chinese metaphysics of the self”, if it is “to enter into contemporary discussions of justice and 
agency”, then, he asserts, it “needs a metaphysical expression that can relate it to psychology, 
neurophysiology and all the social sciences”.36 There are two points that I would like to make. The 
first is that the it strikes me as odd that Neville does not only ask for Chinese philosophers to give 
up-to-date expressions of Chinese metaphysics, which I would agree with, but that he also seems to 
                                                
34  Neville, 2003, 313. 
35  See the proceedings of the 2010 Summer ICCCP and ACPA Beijing Conference: Metaphysics and Epistemology in 
Chinese Philosophy – A Systematic and Comparative Approach, Renmin University of China, 10–11 July 2010. 
36  Neville, 2003, 320. 
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be positive that such expressions would certainly turn out to be a contribution. In his comments on 
the Chinese and especially the Confucian conception of ritual (which he asserts is of a “fundamental 
metaphysical or ontological status”) he writes that this “needs a contemporary metaphysical 
expression if its importance is to be seen”.37 But, if we know that it will have importance before it 
has received a contemporary metaphysical expression, then it seems there is no need for such an 
expression. If there is a need, then it cannot be simply presupposed that it will have importance. It 
might not. I think that Neville mistakes what is an assumption (and a questionable assumption for 
that matter) for a certainty. The second point is that he effectually draws up a counter-discourse 
between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ metaphysics and between China and “the West”. In his discussion 
of distributive justice, for example, he writes that “the West has seen the demands that individuals 
can make on distributive justice, China has seen the obligations of deference individuals have 
toward others related o them ritually.”38 In another passage, he contrasts “Western approaches” 
with “the Chinese metaphysical imagination”, the latter representing an interesting twist, for what 
the nature and status of a “metaphysical imagination” should be is left unclear.39 
 The emphasis on the adjective ‘Chinese’ in the expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ with many 
writers serves to establish a counter-discourse, which seeks to articulate an understanding of 
metaphysics (from some points of view surely a more inclusive understanding) based on writings 
considered to be ‘Chinese’. Often that understanding is said to include a moral or religious 
dimension that is lacking in the discourse against which the one of ‘Chinese metaphysics’ is 
articulated. Mou Zongsan’s notion of “moral metaphysics” (???????)  is an example of 
this, consciously set against Kant’s metaphysics of morals (Metaphysik der Sitten), which Mou 
finds deficient. It seems to be the paramount role that both Kant and Mou accord to 
transcendentalism which makes the latter use the word ‘metaphysics’. Where they differ is that 
Kant bases his transcendentalism on reason whereas Mou bases his on intuition. Mou Zongsan’s 
transcendentalism surely is most sophisticated and worthy of studying. But, again, the difference 
between him and Kant can easily be argued without any reference to the word ‘Chinese’. It is in my 
view simply unnecessary and even misleading to the point of being counterproductive in its 
reificationist implications to argue the thesis that the emphasis on intuition is ‘Chinese’ whereas the 
one on reason is not.  
There is indeed a thin line separating writings considered to be ‘Chinese’ because they 
happen to be written in Chinese from those considered to be ‘Chinese’ because they express 
something more deeply ‘Chinese’. A host of different reasons may motivate argumentations for an 
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intuitionist metaphysics that is presented as importantly ‘Chinese’ in that latter sense, involving 
again different senses of the term. ‘Chinese’ might still simply refer to the Chinese language, but 
that difference in language might then be argued to be tantamount to a difference in thinking. Such 
difference in thinking has often sustained arguments about ‘Chinese metaphysics’. Notions such as 
the ‘Chinese mind’, the ‘Chinese worldview’, the ‘Chinese tradition’, ‘Han thinking’ or ‘Chinese 
culture’ have been and still are invoked to this end. Yet, these notions stand for far-reaching 
generalizations and if used must be given careful consideration and argumentation. All too easily 
they might be expressive of what I call ‘the politics of comparative philosophy’. They establish as 
useful a difference between ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ which is claimed to be philosophically 
relevant, but claiming that difference might as much be politically motivated or conducive to 
political instrumentalization by others. 
 
4. ‘Chinese Metaphysics’ and the Politics of Comparative Philosophy 
There surely often is a political side to claiming a philosophical difference between ‘Chinese’ and 
‘non-Chinese’ metaphysics. Feng Youlan ???  (1895–1990) has for instance written that 
“Western philosophy has naturally been dominated by the positive method [of metaphysics], and 
Chinese philosophy by the negative one.”40 Although he allows for some exception to this 
generalized claim (yet is silent about Confucianism when making his point about a ‘Chinese’ 
philosophy of silence), he readily characterizes the negative method as following “intuition” 
(agreeing with Northrop) and as being that of “mysticism”, which is able to reveal “certain aspects 
of the nature of that something [i.e. the object of metaphysics], namely those aspects that are not 
susceptible to positive description and analysis.”41 The passages concerned are in my view not very 
clear, but that is not my major concern. What I find puzzling rather is that the very characteristic 
with which ‘Chinese’ and other ‘Asian thought' has been debased in colonial times as in claims that 
‘Chinese thought’ is not quite philosophy but rather religion or mysticism, is here being 
reconfirmed. Similar arguments abound in contemporary scholarship. Feng and those who write in a 
similar vein rely on the distinction between rationality and intuition in much the same way as that 
which has been exposed as a tool of political oppression and imperialism.42 Although I cannot 
argue this case in any satisfying detail here, I would suggest that those scholars who use the 
                                                
40  Feng, 1948, 340–341 (emphasis mine; one wonders what that “naturally” should mean). “The essence of the positive 
method is to talk about the object of metaphysics which is the subject of its inquiry; the essence of the negative 
method is not to talk about it.”  
41 Feng, 1948, 340. 
42  When he claims that “mysticism is not the opposite of clear thinking, nor is it below it”, it rather is “beyond it”, 
being not “anti-rational” but “super-rational”, he does not and perhaps cannot give any supporting arguments for this 
point. It remains a claim without argument, the truth or persuasiveness of which perhaps must be intuited. But on that 
basis, one could always claim the opposite, and intuition would stand against intuition. See: Feng, 1948, 342. 
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expression ‘Chinese metaphysics’ to establish a counter-discourse of intuition against that of 
rationality remind themselves that they are drawing on an argument that goes back to Feng Youlan 
and even much further back to many 19th century comparisons of ‘European’ vs. ‘Chinese thought’ 
and that the distinction has been fairly thoroughly exposed for its underlying political ramifications 
by postcolonial scholarship.   
The difference between ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ might well encourage arguments in the 
style of ‘we’ vs. ‘they’ which, if not critically reflected, might be exploited by others for political 
ends. For one example, it might express the sort of ‘cultural nationalism’ that John Makeham has 
found underlying much of academic discourse on Confucianism in contemporary China. Makeham 
has subjected that discourse to a critical reading, particularly “the influential thesis that the core or 
essence of Chinese culture is ruxue [??]”, the political dimension of which has been highlighted 
many times, e.g. very recently by Li Ling ?? in his reaction to Yu Dan ?? and to some New 
Confucians on the Chinese mainland.43 In Makeham’s view, that thesis expresses not only a 
culturalism, i.e. the view that “cultural identity ‘trumps’ or is more primordial than political or even 
ethnic identity” as perhaps best or most influentially articulated by Tu Weiming’s notion of a 
‘cultural China’ (????). The thesis rather is advanced in a differently nuanced manner, which 
includes a connection between culture and nation and thus a straightforward political move. 
Makeham writes: 
Closer analysis of culturalism, however, reveals that the concept does not adequately convey widespread contemporary 
views about the connection between ruxue and Chinese identity, in particular, the ideas that ruxue (or rujia thought) has 
blended into the national character of the Chines people; has created the national character; is the principal component of 
‘the Han nation’s cultural-psychological formation’ (wenhua xinli jiegou ??????); is the Chinese people’s national 
spirit; is the foundation of the Chinese nation’s (Zhonghua minzu ????) identity; is the inner soul of the nation; and is 
the manifestation of the unconscious collective archetype of the Han nation.44 
Whereas the culturalist posits culture, rather than polity or ethnicity, as the principal source of community identity 
consciousness or ‘subjectivity,’ the cultural nationalist takes the further step of stipulating that it is the unique culture 
associated with a particular form of community identity – a nation – that constitutes the basis of that identity.45 
One influential version of the thesis draws on Li Zehou’s (???) notion of a “national cultural-
psychological formation”, although as concerns Li it should be mentioned that this sort of ruxue is 
in his view so integral to Chinese identity that it needs not much promotion at all.46 But others, for 
instance, Fang Keli ???, see the need for such promotion and even speak of “a slogan for 
‘united front’ activities”. Makeham quotes Fang: 
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China (Zhongguo ??) is not disunited but united because Chinese (Zhonghua ??) culture is united. Viewed 
historically, the disunity of China’s political territory was only ever able to be temporary because the concept of “cultural 
China” has a long-lasting, even eternal, significance. … There were many periods in Chinese history when the political 
territory was disunited, but culturally China has always been united. It is this cultural unity that has been an important 
element in helping to bring about China’s political unity.47   
This is to show how quickly philosophical arguments are used for political purposes. Although talk 
about ‘Chinese metaphysics’ does not exactly correspond with the talk that Makeham examines (for 
the former may well include much discourse drawing on sources other than ruxue), the claims as to 
the meaningfulness of the qualifying adjective ‘Chinese’ are very similar.  
To conclude, I am not claiming that all talk about ‘Chinese metaphysics’ is driven by 
nationalist political aims. But if the use of the term ‘Chinese’ in the expression is not supplemented 
with reasons, it might lend itself to or might easily be abused for political purposes. That not all 
uses need to be driven by nationalist motifs is obvious from the fact that writers such as François 
Jullien construct similar philosophical arguments, but can hardly be said to pursue a Chinese 
nationalism (although that does not preclude other political motivations). But this, if anything, 
supports my main contentions: For the sake of philosophical argument, it is hardly ever necessary to 
go down the road of ‘Chinese’ versus ‘non-Chinese’. Yet, if that road is taken as it is often taken in 
talk about ‘Chinese metaphysics’, then a focus on the political side of things might be worthwhile. 
Some part of that talk expresses little else than ‘the politics of comparative philosophy’, a critical 
discussion of which might eventually be not least in the interest of those who are seriously 
concerned about the philosophical implications of their arguments, but have no interest in politics 
whatsoever. 
 
 
 
                                                
47  Fang is quoted by Makeham from his “‘Wenhua Zhongguo’ gainian xiaoyi??????????” of 1993. See: 
Makeham, 2008, 11. 
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